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ABSTRACT
We study the usability of linguistic features in the Web spam
classification task. The features were computed on two Web
spam corpora: Webspam-Uk2006 andWebspam-Uk2007, we
make them publicly available for other researchers. Pre-
liminary analysis seems to indicate that certain linguistic
features may be useful for the spam-detection task when
combined with features studied elsewhere.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.1 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Content
Analysis and Indexing—Linguistic processing ; I.2.6 [Arti-
ficial Intelligence]: Learning
General Terms
Web spam
Keywords
Web spam detection, content features, linguistic features
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we extend the work reported in Sydow et
al. [12] by introducing more linguistic-based features and
studying their potential usability for Web spam classifica-
tion. Our effort is complementary to the work on content-
based features reported by others (see Section 1.1). The
main contributions are: (1) Computing over 200 new lin-
guistic-based attributes; in order to get a better, less biased
insight, we tested various NLP tools and two Web spam cor-
pora together with 3 different document length-restriction
modes. (2) Preparing and studying over 1200 distributions
of all the attributes as potential Web spam discriminators.
(3) Experimentally identifying the most promising attribu-
tes with use of 2 objective metrics. (4) Making the computed
attributes with the corresponding histograms available for
the research community at: http://www.pjwstk.edu.pl/
~msyd/lingSpamFeatures.html.
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All the features discussed in this paper are computation-
ally amenable and can be calculated at the document level
which can be beneficial for future on-line computation thereof.
1.1 Related Work
The usability of various content-based features for the suc-
cessful Web spam classification has been reported before.
Fetterly et al. [7] proved that simple frequency-based mea-
sures are useful for the task. Drost et al. [4] extended the list
by adding features based on checksums and word weighting
techniques. This direction was further explored by Ntoulas
et al. in [11]. Mishne et al. [10] analyzed the contents of
a Web document to compare its language model with that
of the citing blog in order to detect blog spam. Fetterly
et al. [8] reported on techniques for identifying spam pages,
whose content is automatically generated by gluing together
phrases copied from non-spam pages. Urvoy et al. [13] in-
troduced features based on HTML document structure to
detect automatically generated, pattern-based spam pages.
Benczur et al. [2] studied commercial attractiveness of pages
via utilization of Microsoft OCI, Yahoo! Mindset, and key-
words extracted from Google AdWords and Google AdSense.
Building on many previous results, some authors reported
automatic spam classification utilizing both content-based
and link-based features and deploying additional more so-
phisticated techniques on top of these features including bag-
ging, exploration of the link structure for label-smoothing, 2-
level stacked graphical learning, and graph regularizations [3,
1].
2. LINGUISTIC FEATURES
Zhou et al. [15] proved that certain language features have
discriminatory potential for human deception detection in
text-based communication. Motivated by this work, we se-
lected and adapted a subset of these features for analyzing
their usability for Web spam classification. We considered
only features, whose computation does not involve much lin-
guistic sophistication since the open and unrestricted na-
ture of texts on the Web indicates that utilization of any
more error-prone higher-level linguistic tools would intro-
duce more noise.
Two NLP tools were used to compute linguistic features:
Corleone [9], which comes with a morphological analyzer
based on the extended MULTEXT resources [5]1, and Gen-
eral Inquirer2—a tool which maps an input text with counts
1It has an average coverage of 95% on unseen data
2http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer
on dictionary-supplied categories (performing also word sense
disambiguation). The current version combines the Harvard
IV-4 and Laswell dictionary content-analysis categories, to-
talling 182 categories in all.
We limited computing the features for HTML bodies of
each page (converted to text) and made a simplistic assump-
tion that all the processed texts are in English, which seems
to be true for most of the documents in the .uk domain.
2.1 Corleone-based features
The features computed with Corleone are mainly based
on statistics of part-of-speech (POS) information. However,
no POS disambiguation has been performed for the reasons
mentioned earlier (open-domain character of the Web)—
when we refer to POS tags here, in case of ambiguous words,
the tags represent all readings, e.g., the word fight is assigned
the NV tag since it could be either a noun (N) or a verb (V).
Type: Web pages may include free text, numerical data
or a combination of both. We introduced two attributes to
estimate the ‘type’ (character) of the page:
Lexical validity =
# of valid word forms
# of all tokens
Text-like fraction =
# of potential word forms
# of all tokens
The term ‘potential word forms’ refers to the tokens which
undergo morphological analysis—tokens representing num-
bers, URLs, punctuation signs and non-letter symbols are
not counted as potential word forms.
Quantity: In the context of text quantity we computed the
ratio of nouns (Noun Fraction), verbs (Verb Fraction), pro-
nouns (Pronoun Fraction) and tokens starting with capital
letters (Capitalized Tokens) to the total number of tokens.
Diversity: We have explored three types of text diversity,
namely lexical diversity, content diversity and syntactical
diversity, which are defined as follows.
Lexical diversity =
# of different tokens
# of all tokens
Content diversity =
# of different nouns & verbs
# of all nouns & verbs
Syntactical diversity =
# of different POS n-grams
# of all POS n-grams
The words with an initial capital, which were tagged by the
morphological component as ‘unknown’ were considered in
the context of computing Content diversity as nouns. Syn-
tactical diversity has been calculated for 2, 3 and 4-grams.
Further, we computed Syntactical entropy, i.e., the en-
tropy of the distribution of POS-based n-grams (2, 3 and 4
grams). Let G = g1, . . . , gk be the set of all POS n-grams in
a page and let {pg} be the distribution of POS n-grams in
G. The syntactical entropy is calculated as:
Syntactical Entropy = −
X
g∈G
pg · log pg
Expressivity: As an indication of language expressivity, we
have selected Emotiveness, which is the ratio of modifiers to
content words, i.e., it is formally defined as follows.
Emotiveness =
# of adjectives & adverbs
# of all nouns & verbs
Non-immediacy: Linguistic non-immediacy can be seen as
the degree of verbal indirectness with which communicators
– ‘Osgood’ semantic dimensions
– pleasure, pain, virtue and vice
– overstatement/understatement
– language of a particular
‘institution’
– roles, collectivities, rituals,
and interpersonal relations
– references to people/animals
– processes of communicating
– valuing of status, honor,
recognition and prestige
– references to
locations
– references to
objects
– cognitive
orientation
– pronoun types
– negation and
interjections
– verb types
– adjective types
– skill categories
– motivation
– adjective types
– power
– rectitude
– affection
– wealth
– well-being
– enlightenment
Figure 1: Overview of GI categories.
refer to themselves. We defined two scores for measuring
the degree of non-immediacy, which are defined as follows.
Passive Voice =
# of passive constructions
# of all verbs
Self Referencing =
# of 1st person pronouns
# of all pronouns
Uncertainty: For measuring the uncertainty we computed
the ratio of modal verbs to the total number of verbs in a
page (Modal Verbs).
Affect: For computing the affect of pages we have utilized
SentiWordNet [6] (integrated in Corleone), in which each
synset s of WordNet3 is associated with two numerical
scores, namely, the Pos(s) and Neg(s), which describe how
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ the terms contained in synset s are.
In particular, we computed PosSent and NegSent score of
text T = t1 . . . tn, where ti is the i-th token in the text, as
follows.
PosSent =
P
t∈T max(Pos(t))P
t∈T max(Pos(t)) + max(Neg(t))
NegSent =
P
t∈T max(Neg(t))P
t∈T max(Pos(t)) + max(Neg(t))
A token (term) t might potentially have different senses.
Therefore, we compute for each token t the maximum of Pos
and Neg scores for the corresponding synsets t belongs to.
In this way, terms, which might be used in both positive and
negative sense of equal strength, are somehow ‘neutralized’.
Next, we computed an unweighted affect score, which is
the ratio of ‘positive’ tonality expressions to all opinion ex-
pressions (Tonality) based on ca. 1200 opinion expressions.
2.2 Features obtained with General Inquirer
General Inquirer (GI ) 182 categories were developed for
social-science content analysis applications. The values as-
signed by GI for these categories are based on occurrence
statistics. Some of them overlap with the features defined
in section 2.1. We treated each GI category as a separate
feature. A snapshot of category types covered by GI is given
in Table 1, more details are available at the Web page.4
3. EXPERIMENTS
3.1 Data sets
We used two Web spam data sets: WebSpam-Uk2006 and
WebSpam-Uk2007 [14]. These data sets concern two gen-
eral crawls of the .uk Web domain and provide each page’s
3http://wordnet.princeton.edu
4http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/homecat.htm
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Figure 2: The histograms for Syntactical Diversity
(4-grams), mode-2, WebSpam-Uk2007.
content, links and human-assessed categories of each host
(spam, non-spam, borderline, undecided).
In our experiments, we restricted ourselves to a breadth-
first 400-page-per-host sample of the overall collection. The
original GZIP-compressed WARC files were first converted
into binary, block-compressed sequence files, suitable for dis-
tributed parallel processing using the map-reduce program-
ming paradigm. The Hadoop project5 running on a cluster
of 10 quad-core machines was used for all computations. The
data set statistics are given in Table 1.
3.2 Histograms
For the two data sets we calculated linguistic attributes
using Corleone and General Inquirer. We considered 3 dif-
ferent modes: (0) all the non-empty documents containing
less than 50k tokens, (1) only the documents containing be-
tween 150 and 20k tokens and (2) only the documents con-
taining between 400 and 5k tokens. The modes (1) and
(2) were introduced to examine the influence of very short
documents (which potentially bring much noise) and very
long documents (which slow down the computations with-
out adding much information, due to the power-law-like dis-
tribution of the document lengths).
For each of the 6 setting combinations described above
we computed 208 linguistic attributes (23 for Corleone and
185 for General Inquirer) for each page satisfying the length
constraints of the appropriate mode. Then, for each at-
tribute’s value we created document-level distribution his-
tograms for the three possible human-given labels: spam,
non-spam, borderline (documents receive the label of their
host, since no document-level labels are available for either
WebSpam-Uk2006 or WebSpam-Uk2007 corpus). This re-
5http://hadoop.apache.org
Table 1: Simple statistics of input data sets.
2006 2007
pages 3 396 900 12 533 652
pages without content 65 948 1 616 853
pages with HTTP/404 281 875 230 120
WARC (compressed file, GB) 14.10 45.50
HTML SQF (compressed file, GB) 11.70 37.80
TXT SQF (compressed file, GB) 2.87 8.24
sulted in over 1200 histograms. All histograms represent
attributes’ value ranges (bins) on the horizontal axis and
the percentage of pages that fell in each bin on the vertical
axis. A preliminary study of the histograms revealed that:
– the histograms generated with the length restrictions are
noticeably less noisy than the corresponding histograms
computed without such restrictions (mode 0)
– mode-2 histograms seemed to be a bit less noisy than
mode-1 histograms. Therefore, we used only the mode-2
attributes for computing the statistics in the next section.
– the borderline histograms are in general closer to spam
histograms, but this has to be studied more rigorously.
3.3 Objective selection of the best attributes
To extend the subjective observations and preliminarily
identify the most promising attributes with some objective
methodology, we introduced two difference measures: abs-
Dist and sqDist, defined below. For each attribute we mea-
sured the difference between spam and non-spam class dis-
tributions using the measures.
Let, for some attribute histogram h, {sh}i and {nh}i de-
note the sequences of heights of the bars for spam and non-
spam classes, respectively, for all the considered bins i ∈ I.
We define the distance metric absDist as follows:
absDist(h) =
X
i∈I
|shi − nhi |/200
which can be interpreted as the fraction of the total area
under the histogram curves corresponding to the symmetric
difference between them (the area under each histogram is
equal to 100 units). Another distance measure is sqDist,
defined for a histogram h as:
sqDist(h) =
X
i∈I
(shi /maxh − nhi /maxh)2/|I|
where maxh, a kind of normalization factor, is defined as
the maximum value among both {sh}i and {nh}i.
The first metric seems to be more intuitive, since it has
more natural geometrical interpretation, however using two
different metrics may result in less bias. For both metrics
the higher values indicate better discriminative power.
Next, for each out of over 1200 histograms we computed
both measures and, for each of the 6 settings, we sorted the
values decreasingly to identify topmost attributes. Inter-
estingly, the choice of the length-restriction mode is almost
insignificant to the ranking of the top-10 attributes in any of
the 6 settings for both distance measures. For example, the
list of the top 9 Corleone attributes (according to any dis-
tance measure) is the same for both data sets despite the fact
that the 2 metrics are quite different. The results are pre-
sented in Table 2. In case of abstDist some histograms differ
by almost 25% of the AUC, which seems to indicate their
potential discriminatory power. The histograms for Syn-
tactical Diversity with 4-grams for the mode-2 size-filtered
WebSpam-Uk2007 corpus is shown in Figure 2.
We did analogous experiments also for the GI -generated
attributes. For the absDist metric, the list of the top-7 at-
tributes was identical on both the data sets (though the
ordering was a bit different) (see Table 3). Notice that for
some attributes the histograms for spam and non-spam dif-
fer by almost 30% of the AUC, which is even more promising
than in the case of the Corleone-generated attributes.
The sqDist metric identified two identical top-9 lists of
attributes generated by General Inquirer for both corpora
Table 2: The most discriminating Corleone at-
tributes wrt absDist and sqDist metric.
Corleone(absDist) 2007 2006 Corleone (sqDist) 2007 2006
Passive Voice 0.263 0.273 Syn. Diversity (4g) 0.053 0.054
Syn. Diversity (4g) 0.255 0.245 Syn. Diversity (2g) 0.050 0.067
Content Diversity 0.234 0.331 Syn. Diversity (2g) 0.037 0.036
Syn. Diversity (3g) 0.230 0.253 Content Diversity 0.032 0.065
Pronoun Fraction 0.224 0.261 Syn. Entropy (2g) 0.029 0.026
Syn. Diversity (2g) 0.221 0.232 Lexical Diversity 0.026 0.043
Lexical Diversity 0.213 0.262 Lexical Validity 0.024 0.033
Syn. Entropy (2g) 0.208 0.179 Pronoun Fraction 0.024 0.031
Text-Like Fraction 0.188 0.184 Text-Like Fraction 0.023 0.017
(Table 3). There is a significant overlap between the 2 lists
of attributes identified by the two, quite different metrics.
Some GI -generated attributes were identified as among
the top-10 by one or another measure or setting. Among
them were: EnlOth, EnlTot (enlightenment words) WltTot,
WltOth (words in wealth domain, e.g., pursuit of wealth),
ECON, Econ@dat (words of commercial or business orienta-
tion), Objects (words referring to objects, e.g., food, vehicles,
buildings), and Leftovers (encompasses several ‘Lasswell dic-
tionary’ attributes not associated with any other ‘large’ cat-
egories in GI, and includes words of accomplishment, trans-
action, desired or undesired ends or goals, words referring
to means and utility, words denoting actors, nations and
emotions). The fact that the top GI -generated attribute
lists are less stable than the Corleone-generated ones, can
be explained by the fact that the size of the full set of GI
attributes is over 7 times bigger than the Corleone set).
Table 3: The most discriminating General Inquirer
attributes according to absDist and sqDist metric.
GI(absDst) 2007 2006 GI(sqDist) 2007 2006
WltTot 0.287 0.346 leftovers 0.0150 0.0128
WltOth 0.285 0.341 EnlOth 0.0085 0.0072
Academ 0.270 0.263 EnlTot 0.0082 0.0118
Object 0.255 0.282 Object 0.0073 0.0086
EnlTot 0.249 0.247 text-length 0.0056 0.0048
Econ@ 0.228 0.356 ECON 0.0038 0.0034
SV 0.206 0.260 Econ@ 0.0038 0.0031
WltTot 0.0038 0.0027
WltOth 0.0037 0.0024
3.4 Discussion
In general, we observed that the best attributes that we
have computed (accordingly to the applied metrics) are quite
promising for discriminating between the spam and non-
spam classes, due to quite remarkable distribution differ-
ences. Also, the top-lists of the attributes are quite stable
wrt the choice of the Web Corpus, which is an important
positive property of the studied attributes.
The tables presented in the previous section seem to indi-
cate that some GI -generated attributes have more potential
discriminative power than Corleone-generated ones. Unsur-
prisingly, the top-scoring GI attributes refer to vocabulary
centering around purchasing goods, transactions, business,
industry, non-human objects and enlightenment.
Another interesting finding is that syntactical diversity
showed better discriminative power than lexical diversity.
This means that spam pages consisting of loosely assem-
bled keywords can be determined using shallow syntactical
analysis. On the other hand, no attribute showed clear sep-
aration between spam and non-spam classes. This is most
likely because of the fact that spammers often reuse existing
Web content and either repeat it literally or interleave it with
their own content. Finally, in contrast to the work presented
in [15], expressivity, uncertainty, and affect, do not seem to
have any discriminatory power for differentiating spam from
non-spam pages. Possibly, more sophisticated attributes for
computing the aforementioned language features should be
studied in order to get a better insight.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We reported on the computation of over 200 linguistic-
based attributes on two publicly available reference Web
spam corpora and discussed the general properties of over
1200 analyzed histograms.6 To our best knowledge, such at-
tributes have not been previously studied in the context of
Web spam detection. In particular, two distribution differ-
ence metrics were used for identifying the most promising at-
tributes. The list of the latter ones seems to be stable across
a couple of different settings, however their real usefulness
is to be studied in the future. All the computed attributes
and histograms are available for research purposes.
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